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Abstract
The domain of single crossing preference profiles is a widely studied domain in so-
cial choice theory. It has been generalized to the domain of single crossing preference
profiles with respect to trees which inherits many desirable properties from the single
crossing domain, for example, transitivity of majority relation, existence of polyno-
mial time algorithms for finding winners of Kemeny voting rule, etc. In this paper, we
consider a further generalization of the domain of single crossing preference profiles
on trees to the domain consisting of all preference profiles which can be extended to
single crossing preference profiles with respect to some tree by adding more prefer-
ence orderings to it. We call this domain the weakly single crossing domain on trees. It
is known that most of the desirable properties of the single crossing domain on trees
continue to hold for the weakly single crossing domain on trees. In this paper, we prove
several interesting structural properties of the weakly single crossing domain on trees
and exploit them to design efficient algorithms for recognizing and eliciting weakly
single crossing preference profiles on trees. In particular, we begin with showing that,
for every weakly single crossing preference profile P on trees, there exists a unique
inclusion-minimal set of preference orderings Q whose inclusion in P makes the re-
sulting profile P = P ⊎Q single crossing with respect to some tree. We call the profile
P the closure of P. Using this uniqueness of closure property of weakly single crossing
preference profiles on trees and the known recognition algorithm of single crossing
preference profiles on trees due to Clearwater et al. [CPS15], we design a polynomial
time algorithm for recognizing weakly single crossing profiles on trees. We then move
on to develop a polynomial time algorithm with low query complexity for eliciting
weakly single crossing preference profiles on trees even when we do not know any
tree with respect to which the closure of the input preference profile is single crossing
and the preferences can be queried only sequentially; moreover, the sequential order
of the input preference profile is also unknown. We complement the performance of
our preference elicitation algorithm by proving that our algorithm makes an optimal
number of queries up to constant factors when the number of preference orderings in
the input preference profile is large compared to the number of candidates, even if the
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input preference profile is known to be single crossing with respect to some given tree
and the preference orderings can be accessed randomly.
1 Introduction
Aggregating preferences of a set of agents is a common problem in multiagent systems. In
a typical setting, we have a set of m candidates, a set of n voters each of whom possesses a
preference which is a linear order (reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive relations) over
the set of candidates, and we would like to aggregate these preferences into one preference
which intuitively “reflects” the preference of all the voters. However, it is well-known that
the pairwise majority relation of a set of preferences may often be intransitive due to
existence of Condorcet cycles – a set of candidates {ci : i ∈ [ℓ]} where ci is preferred over
ci (mod ℓ)+1 by a majority of the voters for every i ∈ [ℓ] (see Moulin [Mou91]). Consecutively,
a substantial amount of research effort has been devoted to finding interesting restrictions
on the preferences of the voters which ensure transitivity of the majority relation (see
Merlin and Gaertner [MG04] for a survey).
Among the most widely used domains in social choice theory are the single peaked and
single crossing domains. Introduced by Black [Bla48], the single peaked domain not only
satisfies transitivity of majority relation but also captures the essence of many election
scenarios including political elections [HM97]. Intuitively, a profile, which is a tuple of
preferences of all the voters, is called single peaked if the candidates can be arranged
in a linear order (often called societal axis or harmonious order) and every voter can
be placed somewhere in that linear order so that she prefers candidates “closer” to her
than candidates “far” from her. The notion of single peakedness has subsequently been
generalized further, often at the cost of the transitivity property of majority relation. For
example, the popular single peaked domain on trees [Dem82] only guarantees existence
of a Condorcet winner (for an odd number of voters) and the notion of single peaked
width [CGS12] does not even guarantee existence of a Condorcet winner. A Condorcet
winner is a candidate who is preferred over every other candidate by a majority of the
voters.
Mirrlees [Mir71] proposed the single crossing domain where voters (instead of candi-
dates as in the case of single peaked domain) can be arranged in a linear order so that,
for every two candidates x and y, all the voters who prefer x over y appear consecutively.
Other than guaranteeing transitivity property of the majority relation, the single crossing
domain has found wide applications in economics [DS74], specially in redistributive in-
come taxation [Rob77, MR81], trade union bargaining [BC84], etc. The notion of single
crossingness has further been generalized with respect to median graphs while maintain-
ing the transitivity of the majority relation [Dem12]. A graph is called a median graph if,
for every three nodes, there exists a unique node which is present in the shortest paths
between all three pairs of nodes. Trees, hypercubes, etc. are important examples of me-
dian graphs. In recent times, Kung applied single-crossingness on trees to the study of
networks [Kun15].
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All the domains discussed above also enjoy other desirable properties. Existence
of strategy-proof voting rules, polynomial time tractability of the problem of finding
the winner for important voting rules like Kemeny [Kem59, Lev75, BBHH15], Dodg-
son [Dod76, BNM+58], Chamberlin-Courant [BSU13, SYFE13, CPS15], etc. are promi-
nent examples of such properties. Domain restrictions in the presence of incomplete votes
(where votes may be partial orders instead of complete orders) has also received sig-
nificant research attention in recent times. Lackner [Lac14] showed that determining
whether a set of incomplete votes is single peaked is a NP-complete problem. Elkind et
al. [EFLO15a] performed similar exercise for the single crossing domain and showed that
although the problem of finding whether a set of incomplete votes is single crossing is
NP-complete in general, it admits polynomial time algorithms for top orders and for var-
ious other practically appealing cases. Elkind and Lackner [EL15] extended the notions
of single peakedness and single crossingness to approval votes and showed that various
computational problems that are hard in the approval voting setting become polynomial
time tractable. In a approval voting scenario, every vote simply approves a subset of can-
didates instead of specifying a complete ranking of the candidates. Closeness of a profile
to various domains also forms an active body of current research. The work of Erdelyi et
al. [ELP13] and Bredereck et al. [BCW16] showed that the problem of finding the distance
of a profile from the single peaked and single crossing domains are often NP-hard and oc-
casionally polynomial time solvable under various natural notions of distance. Elkind and
Lackner [EL14] provided approximation and fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the
problems of finding the minimum number of votes/candidates that need to be deleted so
that the resulting profile belongs to some specific domain – their algorithms work for any
domain which can be characterized by forbidden configurations and thus, in particular, for
both the single peaked and single crossing domains. Faliszewski et al. [FHH14] studied
various manipulation, control, and bribery problems in nearly single peaked domain and
showed many interesting results; for example, they proved that some control problems
suddenly become NP-hard even in the presence of only one maverick whereas many other
manipulation problems continue to be polynomial time solvable with a reasonable number
of mavericks. We refer the reader to the recent survey article by Elkind et al. [ELP16] and
references therein for a more complete picture of recent research activity in preference
restrictions in computational social choice theory.
1.1 Motivation and Related Work
A property that is usually true for all popular domains is what we call “downward mono-
tonicity” – if a profile belongs to a domain D, then so is any subset of the profile (votes).
To the best of our knowledge, the only important exception to this is the single crossing
domain on trees [CPS14]. Interestingly, the sub-profiles of a single crossing profile on
trees continue to exhibit desirable properties like transitivity of majority relation, poly-
nomial time recognition algorithm [CPS15], existence of polynomial time algorithms for
Kemeny and Dodgson voting rules, etc. This makes the study of the sub-profiles of single
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crossing profiles on trees important. We call the domain consisting of all profiles which
are sub-profiles of some single crossing profile on trees, weakly single crossing domain on
trees. We remark that the domain of top monotonic profiles also does not satisfy similar
notion of downward monotonicity with respect to candidates – deleting candidates from
a top monotonic profile may destroy top monotonicity property. However, the votes are
much more general there than simply being complete rankings and are allowed to be any
complete, reflexive, and transitive (not necessarily anti-symmetric) binary relations. We
refer the interested readers to the work of Barbera and Moreno [BM11] for an elaborate
exposition to top monotonic profiles. We also remark that the idea of defining a domain
as a set of profiles that are obtained by deleting some votes from another profile of a
different domain has been used by Elkind et al. [EFS14] to characterize profiles that are
simultaneously single peaked and single crossing.
One of the first questions to ask for any domain is whether there exists an efficient
recognition algorithm – given a profile P, does there exist a polynomial time algorithm
to decide whether P belongs to the domain? Indeed, there exist efficient recognition
algorithms for many popular domains, for example, single peaked [Tri89], single cross-
ing [BCW13, CPS15], and so on [Kno10, EFLO15b, EF14]. This motivates us to pursue
a similar question for the weakly single crossing domain on trees – does there exist a
polynomial time recognition algorithm for the weakly single crossing domain on trees?
Another fundamental problem in social choice theory is preference elicitation – elicit
the preferences of a set of agents by asking them (hopefully a small number of) comparison
queries. Indeed, in many applications of social choice theory, for example, metasearch
engines [DKNS01], spam detection [CSS99], computational biology [JSA08], the number
of candidates is huge and thus, simply asking the agents to reveal their preferences is
impractical. Conitzer [Con09] showed that, for the domain of single peaked profiles,
we can elicit the preferences of a set of agents by asking a small number of comparison
queries. Recently, a similar study has been carried out for the single peaked domain on
trees [DM16a] and single crossing domain [DM16b]. This motivates us to study preference
elicitation for the weakly single crossing domain on trees.
1.2 Our Contribution
Our specific contributions in this work are as follows.
⊲ Given a weakly single crossing profile P on trees, we show that there exists an
inclusion-minimal profile P which contains P and is itself single crossing with re-
spect to some tree [Theorem 1]. We call P the single crossing tree closure of P.
⊲ We extend the polynomial time recognition algorithm of Clearwater et al. [CPS15]
for single crossing profiles on trees to a polynomial time recognition algorithm for
weakly single crossing profiles on trees. Moreover, for any weakly single crossing
profile P on trees, our recognition algorithm also outputs a tree T on the single
crossing tree closure P of P with respect to which P is single crossing [Corollary 1].
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⊲ We present a polynomial time algorithm with query complexity O(mn +
min{m2, n}m logm) for eliciting weakly single crossing profiles on trees, even if we
do not a priori know any tree with respect to which the single crossing tree closure of
the input profile is single crossing and we are only allowed to access the preferences
in an arbitrary (unknown) sequential order [Theorem 3 and Corollary 2]. We wish
mention that the query complexity of our preference elicitation algorithm matches
(up to constant factors) with the query complexity of preference elicitation algorithm
for single crossing profiles due to Dey and Misra [DM16b].
⊲ We complement the query complexity of our preference elicitation algorithm by
showing that any preference elicitation algorithm for single crossing profiles on trees
has query complexity Ω(mn + m logm), even if the input profile is single crossing
with respect to a known tree and we are allowed to query preferences randomly and
interleave the queries to different preferences arbitrarily [Theorem 4].
2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer ℓ, we denote the set {1, . . . , ℓ} by [ℓ]. For a set X and an integer k,
we denote the set of all possible subsets of X of size k by Pk(X ).
Let V = {vi : i ∈ [n]} be a set of n voters and C = {cj : j ∈ [m]} be a set of m candidates.
If not mentioned otherwise, we denote the set of candidates, the set of voters, the number
of candidates, and the number of voters by C, V, m, and n respectively. Every voter vi has
a preference ≻i which is a complete order over the set C of candidates. We say voter vi
prefers a candidate x ∈ C over another candidate y ∈ C if x ≻i y. We denote the set of
all preferences over C by L(C). The n-tuple (≻i)i∈[n] ∈ L(C)
n of the preferences of all the
voters is called a profile. For a subset M ⊆ [n], we call (≻i)i∈M a sub-profile of (≻i)i∈[n].
We often view a profile P as a multi-set consisting of the preferences in P to avoid use
of cumbersome notations. The view of a profile we are considering will be clear from
the context. Given a preference ≻ L(C) and a positive integer ℓ, we denote the profile
consisting of ℓ copies of the preference ≻ by ≻ℓ. A domain is a set of profiles. The single
crossing domain is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Single Crossing Domain). A profile P = (≻i)i∈[n] of n preferences over a set C
of candidates is called a single crossing profile if there exists a permutation σ of [n] such that,
for every two distinct candidates x, y ∈ C, whenever we have x ≻σ(i) y and x ≻σ(j) y for two
integers i and j with 1 6 σ(i) < σ(j) 6 n, we have x ≻σ(k) y for every σ(i) 6 k 6 σ(j).
Demange significantly generalizes the single crossing domain to the single crossing
domain on median graphs in [Dem12]. A graph G = (V, E) is called a median graph if, for
every three nodes u, v, w ∈ V, there exists a unique vertex m(u, v, w), called the median of
the nodes u, v, and w, which is present in the shortest paths between each pair of u, v, and
w. Trees and hypercubes are important examples of median graphs. In this work, we will
be concerned with trees only. A tree is a connected acyclic graph. A star is a tree where
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there is a central node with whom every other node is connected by an edge. We refer to
[Die97] for common terminologies of trees. Given a tree T and a node u ∈ T , we denote
the tree rooted at u by T [u]. The single crossing domain on trees is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Single Crossing Domain on Trees). Let T be a tree with the set of voters as
the set of nodes of T . A profile P is called single crossing with respect to a tree T if every
sub-profile along every path of T is single crossing.
Let a profile P be single crossing with respect to a tree T . We call T a single crossing
tree of P. We denote the preference associated with a voter (which is a node in T ) u ∈ T
by ≻u. We denote a voter in T associated with a preference ≻∈ P by u≻. An equivalent
condition for a profile to be single crossing with respect to a tree T is that, for every pair
of candidates x, y ∈ C, there exists at most one edge in the cut (Vx≻y,V \Vy≻x), where Vx≻y
is the set of voters who prefer x over y [CPS15]. We now generalize the single crossing
domain on trees to the weakly single crossing domain on trees as follows.
Definition 3 (Weakly Single Crossing Domain on Trees). The weakly single crossing domain
on trees is the set of all profiles P such that there exists a profile P ′ which contains P and is
itself single crossing with respect to a tree T .
2.1 Problem Formulation
We study the following problem for recognizing weakly single crossing profiles on trees.
Problem Definition 1 (WEAKLY SINGLE CROSSING TREE RECOGNITION). Given a profile P,
does P belong to the weakly single crossing domain on trees?
Suppose we have a profile P with n voters and m candidates. Let us define a function
QUERY(x ≻ℓ y) for a voter ℓ and two different candidates x and y to be TRUE if the voter
ℓ prefers the candidate x over the candidate y and FALSE otherwise. We now define the
preference elicitation problem.
Problem Definition 2 (PREFERENCE ELICITATION). Given an oracle access to QUERY(·) for a
profile P, find P.
For two distinct candidates x, y ∈ C and a voter ℓ, we say a PREFERENCE ELICITA-
TION algorithm A compares candidates x and y for the voter ℓ, if A makes a call to either
QUERY(x ≻ℓ y) or QUERY(y ≻ℓ x). We define the number of queries made by the algorithm
A, called the query complexity of A, to be the number of distinct tuples (ℓ, x, y) ∈ V ×C×C
with x 6= y such that the algorithm A compares the candidates x and y for the voter ℓ.
Notice that, even if the algorithm A makes multiple calls to QUERY (·) with same tuple
(ℓ, x, y), we count it only once in the query complexity of A. This is without loss of gener-
ality since we can always implement a “wrapper” around the oracle which memorizes all
the calls made to the oracle so far and whenever it receives a duplicate call, it replies from
its memory without “actually” making a call to the oracle.
The following observation is immediate from standard sorting algorithms like merge
sort.
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Observation 1. There is a PREFERENCE ELICITATION algorithm for eliciting one preference
with query complexity O(m logm).
Model of Input for PREFERENCE ELICITATION There are two prominent models for ac-
cessing the preferences in the literature (see [DM16b]). In the random access model, we
are allowed to query any preference at any point of time. Moreover, we are also allowed to
interleave the queries to different voters. In the sequential access model, voters are arriving
in a sequential manner one after another to the system. Once a voter ℓ arrives, we can
query her preference as many times as we like and then we “release” the voter ℓ from the
system to grab the next voter in the queue. Once the voter ℓ is released, its preference can
never be queried again.
3 Recognizing Weakly Single Crossing Profiles on Trees
In this section, we present our polynomial time algorithm for the WEAKLY SINGLE CROSS-
ING TREE RECOGNITION problem. We begin with bounding the number of distinct prefer-
ences in a profile which is single crossing with respect to some tree. We remark that the
exact same bound of Lemma 1 is known for the single crossing profiles [DM16b].
Lemma 1. Let a profile P of distinct preferences be single crossing with respect to a tree T .
Then |P| 6
(
m
2
)
+ 1.
Proof. Let e = (u, v) ∈ T be any edge of T = (V, E). Since the preferences in P are all
distinct, the set De = {{x, y} ∈ P2(C) :≻u and ≻v order x and y differently} of pairs
of candidates that are ordered differently by the voters u and v is nonempty. Since the
profile P is single crossing with respect to T , for any two distinct edges e1, e2 ∈ T , we
have De1 ∩ De2 = ∅. We also have ∪e∈TDe ⊆ P2(C). Now we bound |P| as follows.
|P| = |E|+ 1 6
(
m
2
)
+ 1
The following result which is immediate from the proof of Lemma 3.7 in [CPS15],
simplifies lot of our proofs.
Lemma 2. Let P = (≻ℓii )i∈[n], ℓi > 0, ∀i ∈ [n], be a profile with ≻i 6=≻j , ∀i 6= j and P
′ =
(≻i)i∈[n] be the profile resulting from P after removing all the duplicate preferences. Then P
is single crossing with respect to some tree if and only if P ′ is single crossing with respect to
some (other) tree. Therefore, P is a weakly single crossing profile on trees if and only if P ′
is a weakly single crossing profile on trees. Moreover, given the tree with respect to which the
profile P is single crossing, we can construct another tree with respect to which P ′ is single
crossing in polynomial amount of time and vice versa.
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We next define the majority relation of a set of preferences which helps us formulate an
important property of single crossing domain with respect to trees. We call that property
the triad majority property. This property will in turn help us in defining and finding
what we call the single crossing tree closure of a weakly single crossing profile on trees.
The notion of a single crossing tree closure plays a central role in our recognition and
elicitation algorithms.
Definition 4 (Majority Relation). Given a profile of n preferences (≻i)i∈[n] ∈ L(C)
n, we call
the relation ≻= Maj((≻i)i∈[n]) = {x ≻ y : x, y ∈ C, |{i ∈ [n] : x ≻i y}| > n/2} the majority
relation of the profile (≻i)i∈[n]. If the majority relation Maj(P) of a profile P turns out to be a
linear order, we say that a majority order of P exists and we call Maj(P) the majority order
of P.
Property 1 (Triad Majority Property). A profile P is said to satisfy the triad majority property
if, for every three preferences (not necessarily distinct) ≻i∈ P, i ∈ [3], the majority relation
Maj((≻i)i∈[3]) of (≻i)i∈[3] is a linear order and Maj((≻i)i∈[3]) ∈ P.
We now show that every single crossing profile on trees, satisfies the triad majority
property.
Lemma 3. Let P be a single crossing profile with respect to a tree T . Then P satisfies the
triad majority property.
Proof. For any three preferences ≻i, i ∈ [3], let the nodes associated with ≻i∈ P, i ∈ [3],
in T be u≻i ∈ T , i ∈ [3]. Let u be the unique node in T that lies in the shortest paths u≻1
to u≻2, u≻2 to u≻3, and u≻3 to u≻1 in T . We claim that Maj(≻1,≻2,≻3) =≻u, where ≻u is
the preference associated with the node u. Suppose not, then there exist two candidates
x, y ∈ C such that x ≻u y, y ≻i x, and y ≻j x for i, j ∈ [3], i 6= j. But then the sub-profile of
P along the path between u≻i, u≻j is not single crossing. This contradicts our assumption
that P is single crossing with respect to the tree T .
We now define the notion of triad majority closure of a profile which will be used
crucially in our algorithm for WEAKLY SINGLE CROSSING TREE RECOGNITION.
Definition 5 (Triad Majority Closure). Let P ′ be a profile that satisfies the triad majority
property and P be a sub-profile of P ′. Then the triad majority closure of P is defined to be the
inclusion-wise minimal profile P that satisfies the triad majority property and contains P.
The following result shows that a triad majority closure of a sub-profile of a profile that
satisfies the triad majority property, is unique thereby establishing the well-definedness of
Definition 5.
Proposition 1. Let P ′ be a profile that satisfies the triad majority property and P be a sub-
profile of P ′. Let P be the triad majority closure of P and M(P) be the set of profiles which
contain P and satisfy the triad majority property. Then P = ∩P ′∈M(P)P
′. Hence, the triad
majority closure of P exists and it is unique.
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Proof. Follows from the fact that, for two profiles P1,P2 that satisfy the triad majority
property and contain P, the profile P1 ∩ P2 also satisfies the triad majority property and
contains P.
Similar to the triad majority closure, we next define the single crossing tree closure.
Definition 6 (Single Crossing Tree Closure). Let P be a weakly single crossing profile on
trees. The single crossing tree closure of P is defined to be the inclusion-wise minimal profile
P which is single crossing with respect to some tree.
The following result shows that, for every weakly single crossing profile P on trees,
the single crossing tree closure P of P exists and is unique, thereby establishing well-
definedness of Definition 6. Moreover, P turns out to be the triad majority closure of
P.
Theorem 1. Let P be a weakly single crossing profile on trees. Then the triad majority
closure P of P is also single crossing with respect to some tree. Therefore, the single crossing
tree closure of P exists, it is unique, and equals to its triad majority closure P . Moreover, the
single crossing tree closure of P can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We can assume, without loss of generality, that the preferences in P are all distinct
due to Lemma 2. Let R be a profile of distinct preferences that is single crossing with
respect to a tree T and P be a sub-profile ofR – such anR exists since P is a weakly single
crossing profile on trees. Let us consider the subgraph T ′ = ∪≻,≻′∈Ppu≻,u≻′ of T , where, for
two nodes u, v ∈ T , pu,v denotes the unique path between u and v in T . We observe that
T ′ is actually a subtree of T since it is a connected subgraph of the tree T . We also observe
that, for every leaf node l of T ′, the preference ≻l corresponding to l always belongs to P.
We iteratively apply the following transformation on T ′ as long as we can: if there exists a
node u in T ′ of degree two such that the preference ≻u associated with u does not belong
to P, then we “bypass” u, that is, we remove u from T ′ along with the two edges incident
on u and add an edge between the two neighbors of u. Let us call the tree T ′′ which results
from T ′ after making all the transformations iteratively as long as we can. We claim that
the triad majority closure P of P is exactly the set Q of preferences associated with the
nodes of the tree T ′′. We first observe that Q satisfies the triad majority property since Q
is single crossing with respect to the tree T ′′ [see Lemma 3]. Now to show that Q is the
triad majority closure of P, it is enough to show that every preference ≻∈ Q \ P is the
majority order of some three preferences in P. Let ≻∈ Q \ P and u ∈ T ′′ be the node in
T ′′ whose corresponding preference is ≻. We observe that the degree of u in T ′′ is at least
3, since otherwise the transformation would have deleted u. So the degree of u in T ′′ is
at least 3. We make T ′′ rooted at u and call it T ′′[u]. Let ui, i ∈ [3], be any three children
of u in T ′′. Let the subtrees of the rooted tree T ′′[u] rooted at ui, i ∈ [3], be Ti, i ∈ [3]. We
observe that there must exists a node vi in Ti such that the preference ≻i attached to vi
belongs to P for every i ∈ [3]. We claim that ≻ is the majority order of (≻i)i∈[3]. Indeed,
otherwise we may assume (by renaming) that there exists two candidates x, y ∈ C such
that x ≻1 y, x ≻u y, y ≻2 x, y ≻3 x. However, this violates single crossing property on the
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path between v2 and v3. Hence ≻ is the majority order of (≻i)i∈[3]. This proves the claim.
Hence, Q is the triad majority closure of P. Also Q is single crossing with respect to the
tree T ′′. Hence, by Lemma 3, Q is the single crossing tree closure of P.
We consider the algorithm A which iteratively adds Maj(≻,≻′,≻′′) to Q (which is ini-
tialized to empty set) for all three (not necessarily distinct) preferences ≻,≻′,≻′′∈ P and
outputs Q. The algorithm A runs in polynomial amount of time. The correctness of A
follows from the first part of the result.
The following result on recognizing single crossing profiles on trees is due to [CPS15].
Theorem 2. (Theorem 4.2 in [CPS15]) Given a profile P, there is a polynomial time algo-
rithm for checking whether there exists a tree T with respect to which P is single crossing.
Moreover, if a single crossing tree exists, then the algorithm also outputs a tree T ′ with respect
to which P is single crossing.
Theorem 1 and 2 give us a polynomial time algorithm for the WEAKLY SINGLE CROSSING
TREE RECOGNITION problem.
Corollary 1. The WEAKLY SINGLE CROSSING TREE RECOGNITION problem is in P.
Proof. We can assume, without loss of generality, that the preferences in P are all distinct
due to Lemma 2. Our algorithm A first constructs the triad majority closure P of P using
the algorithm in Theorem 1. Our algorithm now checks whether P is single crossing with
respect to some tree using Theorem 2. If the algorithm in Theorem 2 outputs YES, then
A also outputs YES and the tree returned by the algorithm in Theorem 2; otherwise A
outputs NO. The correctness of the algorithm follows from Theorem 1 and the correctness
of the algorithm in Theorem 2. The polynomial running time ofA follows from polynomial
running time of the algorithms in Theorem 1 and 2.
4 Preference Elicitation for Weakly Single Crossing Pro-
files on Trees
In this section, we present a polynomial time low query complexity algorithm for eliciting
weakly single crossing profiles on trees. We begin with bounding the degree of any node in
a single crossing tree for a profile consisting of distinct preferences. We use this to bound
the query complexity of our elicitation algorithm.
Lemma 4. Let a profile P of distinct preferences be single crossing with respect to a tree T .
Then the degree of every node in T is at most m− 1.
Proof. Consider any node v in T and let the preference ≻v associated with the node v be
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm. Let the neighbors of the node v in T be ui, i ∈ [ℓ], and the preferences
associated with them be ≻ui , i ∈ [ℓ], respectively. We need to show that ℓ 6 m − 1. We
first observe that, for every i ∈ [m − 1], there exists at most one child uj, j ∈ [ℓ], of the
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node v such that the preference ≻uj associated with the node uj has ci+1 ≻uj ci. Indeed,
otherwise let us assume that there exist two children uj and uj′, j, j
′ ∈ [ℓ], j 6= j′, of the
node v such that the preferences ≻uj and ≻uj′ associated with them both have ci+1 ≻uj ci
and ci+1 ≻uj′ ci. Then the sub-profile along the path uj, v, uj′ is not single crossing which
contradicts our assumption that P is single crossing with respect to the tree T . Hence, for
every i ∈ [m − 1], there exists at most one child uj, j ∈ [ℓ], of the node v such that the
preference ≻uj associated with the node uj has ci+1 ≻uj ci. We also observe that, for every
j ∈ [ℓ], there exists an i ∈ [m − 1] such that ci+1 ≻uj ci since otherwise we have ≻v=≻uj
which contradicts our assumption that the preferences of the profile P are all distinct.
Hence, we have ℓ 6 m − 1 since otherwise we will have i ∈ [m − 1] and j, j′ ∈ [ℓ], j 6= j′,
such that we have both ci+1 ≻uj ci and ci+1 ≻uj′ ci due to pigeon hole argument which
leads to a contradiction as argued above.
We remark that the assumption that the profile in Lemma 4 consists of distinct pref-
erences is crucial since a profile where all the preferences are the same is single crossing
with respect to every tree. We show next a structural result about trees. We will use it
crucially for bounding query complexity of our elicitation algorithm.
Lemma 5. Let T be a tree of size at least 3. Then there exists a node r in T of degree at
least 2 such that the following holds: make the tree T rooted at r; let the neighbors of r be
u1, . . . , uℓ; let the rooted subtrees of T [r] rooted at ui, i ∈ [ℓ], be respectively Ti, i ∈ [ℓ], and
|T1| > |T2| > · · · > |Tℓ|; then |T1| 6 3|T |/4.
Proof. Let u1 be any arbitrary node in T . If u1 satisfies the properties of the lemma, then
we are done. Otherwise, let u2 be the neighbor of u1 such that, if we remove the edge
(u1, u2), then the connected component containing u2 has more than 3|T |/4 nodes. Let
the removal of the edge (u1, u2) creates two connected component V1 and W1 such that
u1 ∈ V1. If u2 satisfies the properties of the lemma, then we are done. Otherwise, we
repeat the above process defining u3 and V2. We observe that V1 ( V2. We continue this
process until we get a node that satisfies the properties of the lemma. The process has to
terminate because otherwise we have an infinite chain V1 ( V2 ( V3 ( · · · ⊆ T . This
cannot happen since all the inclusions in the chain above are proper however Vi ⊆ T for
every i. Hence, the process always terminates with a node satisfying the properties of the
lemma.
Given a profile P of distinct preferences, a tree T with respect to which P is single
crossing, and a preference ≻∈ L(C), we now present an algorithm for finding whether ≻
belongs to T using O(m) calls to QUERY (·). This algorithm is a crucial component in our
PREFERENCE ELICITATION algorithm.
Lemma 6. Given a profile P of distinct preferences, a tree T with respect to which P is
single crossing, and an oracle access to a preference ≻∈ L(C), there exists a polynomial time
algorithm for finding whether ≻ belongs to T using O(m) calls to QUERY (·).
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Algorithm 1 for searching preference in a single crossing tree
Input: A profile P = (≻i)i∈[n] of distinct preferences, a tree T with respect to which P is
single crossing, and a preference ≻∈ L(C)
Output: YES if ≻ belongs to P and NO otherwise
1: while |T | > 3 do
2: r ← a node in T as in Lemma 5. ui, i ∈ [ℓ], ℓ > 2, be the neighbors of r. Let
Ti, i ∈ [ℓ], be the subtrees of T [r] rooted at ui, i ∈ [ℓ], respectively such that |T1| >
|T2| > · · · > |Tℓ|.
3: for i = 1 to ℓ do
4: Let xi, yi ∈ C such that xi ≻r yi and yi ≻ui xi
5: if QUERY (xi ≻ yi)=TRUE then
6: T ← T \ Ti
7: else
8: T ← Ti and exit for loop
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
12: if ≻ belongs to T then ⊲ Can be done in O(m) queries.
13: return YES
14: else
15: return NO
16: end if
Proof. We present our algorithm in Algorithm 1. Let r be a node as in Lemma 5. We
consider the tree T rooted at r which we denote by T [r]. Let the children of r in T [r] be
u1, . . . , uℓ, for some 2 6 ℓ 6 m − 1 (the upper bound of m − 1 follows from Lemma 4),
the rooted subtrees of T [r] rooted at ui, i ∈ [ℓ], be Ti, i ∈ [ℓ], |T1| > |T2| > · · · > |Tℓ|, and
|T1| 6 3|T |/4. Since the profile P consists of distinct preferences, for every i ∈ [ℓ], there
exist two candidates xi, yi ∈ C such that xi ≻r yi and yi ≻ui xi. Let ≻ be the preference
which we have to search in T ; we can access ≻ only through the QUERY (·) function. We
query the oracle for xi versus yi in ≻ . If xi ≻ yi, then ≻ cannot belong to the subtree Ti
and thus we remove Ti from T as done in line 6 of Algorithm 1. On the other hand, if
yi ≻ xi, then ≻ cannot belong to T \Ti and thus we remove T \Ti from T as is done in line
8 of Algorithm 1. Hence, after each iteration of the while loop, ≻ can only belong to T
and every iteration decreases the size of T ; moreover, ≻ can only belong to T . Hence, the
algorithm terminates and is correct. We now turn our attention to the query complexity of
Algorithm 1. For a tree T with n nodes where every preference is over m candidates, let
T (n,m) be the query complexity of the while loop from line 1 to line 11 in Algorithm 1.
Let us consider an iteration of the while loop at line 1. Let k be the number of times the
for loop at line 3 iterates. If k = 1, then the algorithm makes only one query in the current
iteration of the while loop in Algorithm 1 and the number of nodes in the new tree T is
upper bounded by 3/4-th time the number of nodes in the previous T (by the choice of r).
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Algorithm 2 for eliciting a profile which is single crossing with respect to some unknown
tree
Input: π be the order in which voters arrive
Output: Profile of all the voters
1: R,Q ← ∅
2: ⊲ Q stores all the votes seen so far without duplicate. R stores the profile.
3: for i← 1 to n do
4: ⊲ Elicit preference of the ith voter in ith iteration of this for loop.
5: T be the tree with respect to which the single crossing tree closure Q of Q is single
crossing
6: ⊲ Using Theorem 1
7: if ≻π(i)=≻ for some ≻∈ Q then
8: ⊲ Can be done using O(m) queries by Lemma 6
9: R[π(i)] ←≻
10: else
11: R[π(i)] ← Elicit using Observation 1
12: Q ← Q∪ {R[π(i)]}
13: end if
14: end for
For k > 2, we observe that the number of nodes in the new tree T is upper bounded by
1/k-th times the number of nodes in the previous T – this is because the for loop at line
3 iterates according to a nonincreasing order of subtrees. Hence, we have the following
recurrence relation.
T (n,m) 6 max{T (3n/4, m) + 1, max
k={2,...,m}
{T (n/k) + k}}
T (2, m) = T (1, m) = O(m)
We know from Lemma 1 that n 6
(
m
2
)
+1. By solving the above recurrence with the
(
m
2
)
+1
upper bound on n and the fact that line 12 to 16 can be executed with O(m) queries (see
[DM16b]), we get that the query complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(m).
We first present a PREFERENCE ELICITATION algorithm for single crossing profiles on
trees when we are given a sequential access to the preference (the sequential order is a
priori not known) and we do not know any tree with respect to which the input profile is
single crossing.
Theorem 3. Suppose a profile P is single crossing with respect to some unknown tree T .
Suppose we have only sequential access to the preferences whose ordering is also not known a
priori. Then there is a PREFERENCE ELICITATION algorithm for the single crossing profiles on
trees with query complexity O(mn +min{m2, n}m logm).
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Proof. We present our PREFERENCE ELICITATION algorithm in Algorithm 2. We maintain an
array R of length n to store the preferences of all the n voters and a set Q to store all the
distinct preferences seen so far. Let π be the order in which the voters are accessed. To elicit
the preference of voter π(i), we first construct, in polynomial time, a tree T with respect
to which the single crossing tree closure Q of Q is single crossing using Theorem 1. Next
we find whether the preference of the voter π(i) already present in T ; this can be done
in polynomial time with making O(m) calls to QUERY(·) using Lemma 6. If the preference
≻π(i) of the voter π(i) is present in T , we have elicited≻π(i) usingO(m) queries. Otherwise,
we elicit ≻π(i) using O(m logm) queries by Observation 1. However, since the number of
distinct preferences in any profile which is single crossing with respect to some tree is at
most
(
m
2
)
+ 1 due to Lemma 1, we use Observation 1 at most
(
m
2
)
+ 1 times. Hence, the
query complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(mn +min{m2, n}m logm).
Our algorithm in Theorem 3 can readily be seen to work for weakly single crossing
profiles on trees too. Hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. There exists a polynomial time PREFERENCE ELICITATION algorithm for the
weakly single crossing profiles on trees with query complexity O(mn +min{m2, n}m logm).
We prove next that the query complexity upper bound in Theorem 3 is optimal up to
constant factors for a large number of voters (more specifically, when n = Ω(m2 logm)),
even if a tree T is known with respect to which the input profile P is single crossing and
random access to preferences are allowed.
Theorem 4. Let a profile P be single crossing with respect to a tree T . Let T be known
except for the preferences associated with the nodes of T . Then any PREFERENCE ELICITATION
algorithm has query complexity Ω(m logm+mn) even if we are allowed to query preferences
randomly and interleave the queries to different preferences arbitrarily.
Proof. The Ω(m logm) bound follows from the sorting lower bound and the fact that any
profile consisting of only one preference P ∈ L(C) is single crossing. Let T be a star with
one central node and n− 1 leaf nodes attached to the central node with an edge. Suppose
we have an even number of candidates, that is, C = {c1, . . . , cm} for some even integer
m. Consider the ordering Q = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm and the pairing of the candidates
{c1, c2}, {c3, c4}, . . . , {cm−1, cm}. The oracle answers all the query requests consistently ac-
cording to the ordering Q. We claim that any PREFERENCE ELICITATION algorithm A must
compare ci and ci+1 for every voter corresponding to every leaf node of T and for every
odd integer i ∈ [m]. Indeed, otherwise, there exist a voter κ corresponding to a leaf node
of T and an odd integer i ∈ [m] such that the algorithm A does not compare ci and ci+1.
Suppose the algorithm outputs a profile P ′. The oracle fixes the preference of every voter
except κ to be Q. If the voter κ in P ′ prefers ci over ci+1 in P
′, then the oracle fixes the
preference ≻κ to be c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ ci−1 ≻ ci+1 ≻ ci ≻ ci+2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm; otherwise the
oracle fixes ≻κ to be Q. The algorithm fails to correctly output the preference of the voter
κ in both the cases. Also the final profile with the oracle is single crossing with respect to
the tree T . Hence, A must compare ci and ci+1 for every voter corresponding to every leaf
node of T and for every odd integer i ∈ [m] and thus has query complexity Ω(mn).
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Hence, the query complexity of PREFERENCE ELICITATION for the weakly single crossing
profiles on trees, does not depend substantially on how the preferences are accessed and
whether we know a single crossing tree of the single crossing closure of the input profile.
This is in sharp contrast to the corresponding results for single crossing domain where the
query complexity for PREFERENCE ELICITATION improves substantially if we know a single
crossing ordering and we have a random access to the preferences than if we only have
sequential access to preferences [DM16b].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown that, for every weakly single crossing profile on trees, there always ex-
ists a unique inclusion-minimal single crossing profile on trees containing it. We exploit
this uniqueness property along with the known polynomial time recognition algorithm
for single crossing profiles on trees to design a polynomial time recognition algorithm for
weakly single crossing profiles on trees. We have also shown that the query complexity
for preference elicitation for weakly single crossing profiles on trees is small – the query
complexity bounds are similar to the corresponding bounds for single peaked [Con09]
and single crossing profiles [DM16b]. Moreover, we have proved that our preference elic-
itation algorithm makes an optimal number of queries up to constant factors for a large
number of voters. Hence, our results in this paper, along with the fact that the weakly
single crossing domain on trees inherits most of the desirable properties from the single
crossing domain on trees, shows that the weakly single crossing domain on trees is an im-
portant generalization of the single crossing domain on trees. An immediate future work
is to extend our recognition and elicitation algorithms to the more general median graphs.
Characterizing weakly single crossing profiles in trees in terms of forbidden structures is
another important direction of research.
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